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Foreword 
The Future of Cities project is informed by working papers that are commissioned by the 
Lead Expert Group and written by authors from academia and industry.  
These papers highlight the key challenges and opportunities facing cities in the UK out to 
2065. The Expert Group will draw upon this evidence base to develop project outputs 
that will be published in 2014 and 2015.   
These outputs will aim to inform near-term policy making in both local and central 
government, which achieves desirable long-term outcomes for UK cities. 
 
Professor Sir Alan Wilson 
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Executive summary 
This paper is concerned with what urban lives were like around 1980, are now like and 
might be like by the middle of this current century.  
The paper is organised into five sections. First, we examine some classic efforts to 
characterise the very nature of living in the ‘city’. Are city lives in some way distinct and if 
so what is it about them that engenders such characteristics? Second, we describe how 
cities in Britain developed over the past few decades, from the 1970s to the present day. 
Third, a brief account is developed of changing patterns of urban living from around the 
world over roughly the same period. Fourth, we establish a range of possible urban 
futures for the middle of this century drawing upon various kinds of research and 
evidence. Each of these is illustrated by a visualization to capture the main ways in which 
lives would be organised within each city future. The paper tries to address the following 
processes and activities at each historical stage: the movements of people, objects and 
communications; the changing nature and location of work; forms of leisure, 
consumption, and education; and family and friendship life. It should be noted that this 
paper does not consider in any depth issues of governance, finance, food and 
metabolism since these are examined in other Foresight papers being produced in 2014. 
This paper was commissioned from John Urry whose thinking on these topics has been 
influenced by many other academics and intellectuals. These include those involved in 
the Intelligent Infrastructure Systems Foresight Programme that ran 2005-6, and 
especially Glenn Lyons and Andrew Curry. He would also like to thank many colleagues 
working in or connected with the Centre for Mobilities Research at Lancaster University, 
including the three co-authors here, as well as the Lancaster Liveable Cities team.  
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1. What is urban living? 
We begin with briefly considering just what is distinct to ‘living in the city’. Many artists, 
intellectuals and social scientists have puzzled over this issue and have tried to 
characterise the nature of urban living. Is there something about being in the city that 
produces lives that are different from rural lives and if so what might this be? 
At the beginning of the last century, Simmel argued that the modern city provided space 
for the development of each individual and especially in enabling the peculiarities of their 
inner and outer development (Simmel et al., 1997). The spatial form of the city permitted 
the unique development of individuals able to interact with an exceptionally wide range of 
social contacts. But at the same time the richness and diverse stimuli experienced within 
the ‘metropolis’ forced people to develop an attitude of reserve and insensitivity to 
feeling. The urban personality Simmel argued had to become detached and blasé.  
The modern city developed through the money economy was the source of its rationality 
and organisation. There was an increasing concern for precision and punctuality; urban 
dwellers had to be calculative about their activities and relationships. Simmel described 
how those in cities needed to be punctual and the way this came to be based upon 
pocket watches (and then the wristwatch). The watch and its division of time into smaller 
more precise units was key to early twentieth century city life, this small innovation being 
as significant as mobile telephony was more recently to the urban experience.  
Empirical studies of urban living developed during the inter-war period especially at the 
University of Chicago. This involved various attempts to develop an ecological analysis of 
lives within the city. Burgess and colleagues argued that cities were organised into 
concentric rings: beginning from the centre with the central business district; followed by 
the zone of transition of mixed residential and commercial uses; the working class inner 
city; middle-class homes; and the commuter zone at the edge (Park, Burgess & 
McKenzie,1967). Many researchers tried to apply this concentric rings approach to 
various cities around the world. 
The most important theoretical contribution was Wirth’s ‘Urbanism as a way of life’ (Wirth, 
1938). He argued that there were three causes of the differences between urban and 
rural lives: size, which produced segregation, indifference and social distance for those 
living in cities; density, which caused people to relate to each other in terms of specific 
often functional roles; and heterogeneity, which meant that people participated in 
different social circles, none of which commanded their total involvement and which 
generated discrepant and unstable statuses. Wirth claimed that the organisation of space 
in terms of size, density and heterogeneity produced distinct urban lives. And these 
features were contrasted with the small size, low density, homogeneity and ascribed 
characteristics that characterised the opposite to living in the city, of ‘rural’ lives.  
However, some subsequent research showed that there were not always such starkly 
defined patterns of urban (and rural) living. Within cities there were normally some close-
knit urban communities, such as the ‘working class village’ of Bethnal Green famously 
researched in the 1950s. In such urban villages people experienced relatively 
homogenous lives characterised by very short range movement by cycling and walking, 
and normally involving much contact with nearby kin in this case within the local area of 
Bethnal Green (Young & Willmott, 1957).  
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At the same time it was clear that other city areas were becoming increasingly suburban. 
People’s lives here were focussed less upon the neighbourhood and more upon the 
home. Patterns of living became car-based, enabling people to get to work and leisure 
sites and to see family and friends who were likely to live some distance away. Suburban 
patterns of life were found in both urban and rural areas, as during the last century petrol-
based mobility generated a spreading out of the sites of employment, of family life and of 
leisure (Urry, 2013b). Also, in many countries after the Second World War new zoning 
regulations meant that there was more spatial segregation between different areas within 
cities and this increased the need for faster modes of transport so that people could 
move from one such ‘zone’ to another. Montgomery (2013) documents ways that such 
zoning makes people ‘unhappy’. 
Researchers also explored how people variably ‘read’ the cities in which they lived. 
According to Benjamin (1999) this was not merely a matter of intellectual observation but 
also one of fantasy, wish-processes and dreams. Cities were the repository of people’s 
memories of the past. These memories embodied in buildings could be different from 
those meanings imagined by architects and planners. Even derelict buildings leave 
traces and reveal memories, dreams and hopes of previous periods and kinds of life. 
Wright (1992) documented such an array of meanings as he began his journey across 
Britain with interpreting an old toilet in Dalston Lane in East London.  
And indeed, studies of urban lives have shown that cities have become ‘spectacles’ not 
only for residents but for many visitors from elsewhere. Visitors anticipated, read and 
remembered cities. Planners, architects and developers constructed new stage-sets 
within which goods and services were consumed and experienced, beginning with 
Haussmann’s iconic restructuring of Paris in Second Empire France where boulevards 
were driven through the old working class living in the medieval streets (Berman, 1983). 
Cities came to be less places that people originated from and more known for the many 
goods and services that got consumed within them, such as coffee and croissants in the 
typical Parisienne cafe. Cities were transformed into sites for consumption and leisure 
practices and were less organised around production and manufacturing work (Urry, 
1995). The first department stores opened in 1843 in Paris; many new cathedrals of 
consumption developed around the world and they provided models of urban 
development that were often copied and recycled elsewhere.  
Williams (1973) argued that there have been many contrasts drawn between city lives 
and those experienced within the countryside. To think of the city either as a place of 
darkness and squalor or of enlightenment and cosmopolitanism normally rested upon 
presumed contrasts with its ‘other’, of rural lives and the countryside. Williams showed 
that there was no simple and unchanging city and hence no set of unambiguously city 
lives. Much thinking about living in cities depended on what the city was contrasted with, 
what the ‘other’ was to the city.  
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2. British cities since the 1970s 
Many cities in Britain in the 1970s were still organised around their industrial base, of 
extractive and manufacturing industry. Predominantly male-based industry structured the 
lives of many of those in cities. There were many ‘manufacturing towns and cities’, some 
based on coal, shipbuilding and iron and steel, others organised around newer industries 
of chemicals, aerospace and car/vehicle production. These industrial cities possessed 
distinct characteristics: sizeable employment in male-based manufacturing plants located 
within the city; a strong division of gender in employment; leisure and family patterns 
reflecting dominant manufacturing employment; much short range mobility by feet, bike 
and bus especially for commuting; and significant levels of public housing built during the 
1950s and 1960s as working class ‘slums’ were demolished (Harloe, 1995).  
In most British cities many lower density suburbs developed. Suburbs normally involved 
a home-centeredness rather than a street or neighbourhood focus. Houses became 
increasingly full of electricity-based consumer goods especially in the kitchen and the 
sitting room. Many journeys to work and for leisure activities were car-based and there 
was less emphasis upon contact with kin and more with friends often located a distance 
away; and there was some sharing of household tasks and a less marked gender division 
of labour. Those living in suburbs often developed social movements to sustain the low 
densities of housing and population, protecting the size of their gardens and of green 
spaces (Saunders, 1979; Amin & Thrift, 2002). London’s suburban living during the inter-
war period was based more on collective forms of transport. Lives in London were 
distinct with higher levels of service employment, especially in finance, education, health 
and leisure. 
Since around 1980 profound transformations have occurred in people’s experiences 
within British cities which we will now document. First, many cities underwent rapid ‘de-
industrialisation’. Older industrial sectors declined and there was a relocation of 
manufacturing plants out of city centres and often out of Britain altogether. New ‘spatial 
divisions of labour’ developed; older workshops, factories and cramped city locations 
were often closed down and many became derelict (Massey, 1984). There was much 
‘restructuring’ of male-based industry with manufacturing employment in cities often 
falling to less than 15% of total employment. The male-based leisure and consumption 
patterns characteristic of industrial cities were transformed especially with the shift from 
coal to gas and oil as the major forms of fossil fuel energy. Trade union and other 
working class organisations became less significant in organising work and leisure 
experiences especially in the industrial cities of central Scotland, south Wales and the 
north and midlands of England (Mitchell, 2011). According to Hobsbawm’s prescient 
analysis the forward march of labour and of many labourist cities was halted (Hobsbawm, 
1978; Lash & Urry, 1987). 
Second, this economic restructuring led to much inner city deprivation with often very 
rapid population decline, as experienced in Merseyside and in many coal mining, steel-
making and textile-based towns and cities. Those people remaining in inner cities felt 
trapped there especially as the privatising of much public housing meant that there was 
less housing that was affordable (Harrison, 1985; Saunders, 1990). Such inner cities 
were made up of many older people, resource-poor single parent households, few people 
with higher education, many long term unemployed and semi-employed and ethnic in-
migrants. Also some outer estates, such as Kirby and Speke near Liverpool, began to 
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demonstrate similar features of decline and deprivation as post-war factories closed and 
shortages of well-paid skilled work emerged. 
Third, some areas of inner city decline were subject to gentrification, beginning most 
notably in Islington in north London. Previously semi-derelict houses, flats and 
warehouses were bought up cheaply as developers and homeowners were able to turn 
them into newly configured places for urban living (Butler & Savage, 1995). Gentrifiers 
were normally well-educated; many worked in professional and managerial positions in 
education, cultural industries and advertising. A plethora of leisure, educational and arts 
services developed in these gentrified places; a new aesthetic emerged based upon the 
stylishness of refurbished brick, stone and wood; and such gentrifiers often formed and 
supported ‘progressive’ social movements. Some derelict areas under railway arches 
such as Castlefields in Manchester developed into centres of alternative gay, creative 
arts and party spaces (Degen 2008). Gentrification often led to the significant 
displacement of those originally brought up in that area who could no longer afford to live 
there or to enable their children to find housing nearby. 
Fourth, some towns and cities experienced large increases in service industry and 
employment. This was most marked in London. Through a massive expansion of 
financial services following the Big Bang in 1986 London became one of the world’s two 
global cities (New York being the other). This also involved high employment in cultural 
industries, education, fashion, healthcare, media, professional services, research and 
development, tourism and transport. London became more or less the world’s most-
visited city containing four World Heritage Sites as well as many new landmark buildings. 
It became a magnet for tourists as well as in-migrants (population of Greater London is 
just under 8m – see World Population Review, 2014). London now markets itself as a 
centre of cosmopolitan multiculturalism. UK public expenditure is disproportionately spent 
on London with one of the world’s best public transport infrastructures. But its population 
does not appear to lead happy lives. Londoners are especially anxious stemming from 
very uneven levels of income, long commutes, perceived high crime rates and a low 
proportion of people aged over 65 who are more content (BBC, 2013). 
Fifth, other areas outside London came to be organised around fast road travel. 
Especially significant was the M4 corridor that stretches west from London, but similar 
patterns were found around Cambridge, Warrington and the East Midlands. Increasingly 
research, manufacturing and service employment were located in factories and offices 
that were built on greenfield sites that had to be accessed by car. Many people working 
in those workplaces also often lived in newly built estates, some of which were in effect 
gated communities also mainly travelled to and from by car - see Yoo (2014) for an 
upmarket example. These parallel developments helped generate low density sprawl and 
long commuting journeys. Moreover, much research shows that the longer the commute, 
the thinner the social ties that people tend to possess. This in turn reduced people’s 
‘social capital’ and appeared to result in overall lower levels of happiness (Putnam, 2000; 
Montgomery, 2013). 
Sixth, various former cities developed post-industrial strategies especially through 
preserving their industrial and urban heritage. Such a revaluation of the past resulted 
in what Hewison (1987) provocatively called The Heritage Industry. Various 
commentators noted the very rapid growth of museums and heritage centres especially 
in many northern cities previously unattractive to visitors. Urban experiences increasingly 
involved living in a kind of museum with sites of education, leisure and consumption often 
being housed within former industrial premises, beginning with the Wigan Pier Heritage 
Centre (now closed). There was significant employment in this heritage industry, with 
10 
examples of former coalminers becoming guides in ‘mines’ opened to the public (Dicks, 
2000). Many ‘entrepreneurial’ cities developed cultural industry quarters located in former 
industrial premises, the iconic example being the Albert Dock in Liverpool. The central 
areas of cities increasingly developed as ‘spectacles’ where goods and services were 
especially consumed within refurbished heritage environments often now privatised 
(Cronin and Hetherington, 2008). And after dark these heritage environments became 
sites for partying with new night time economies developing in city centres based upon 
much more available alcohol and new kinds of legal and illegal drugs (Chatterton & 
Hollands, 2003). 
Seventh, cities went ‘digital’. Mobile telephony became almost ubiquitous with most 
cities having good coverage for texting, calling, accessing the web, emailing and moving 
about. Almost all indoor and outdoor public spaces were navigated by people connecting 
with others, many not being physically co-present in that space. There was less need for 
the punctuality that Simmel et al. (1997) pointed to, with people negotiating the times and 
places for meeting others (Larsen, Urry & Axhausen, 2006). Moreover, many places were 
available for accessing Wi-Fi so that cafes, bars, libraries and park benches became 
sites for informal working and networking (Mackenzie, 2010). Cities developed very many 
‘third spaces’ that were full of people meeting, communicating, partying and working 
(including the phenomenon of the ‘Coffice’). Workplaces and homes were increasingly 
connected by fast broadband which made possible some novel financial, publishing, 
media and travel enterprises. Many city-dwellers reported that these multiple forms of 
connectivity meant that they were ‘always on’, always available to others for work, family 
life and friendship. There was no escape from ‘miniaturised mobilities’, from those small 
light machines carried on or close to the body that made possible (if the batteries were 
charged!) most arrangements, music, deals, meetings, trends, gossip, news and location 
(Elliott & Urry, 2010). 
Finally, according to Graham (2011) cities were increasingly ‘under siege’ and centres of 
surveillance. The city dweller came to be subject to a kind of digital dissection through 
CCTV cameras, radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, GPS, biometric technologies, 
public transport smart cards, customer loyalty cards, credit cards, passports, internet use, 
and mobile phone records (Amoore, 2011). Especially if these systems were 
interconnected, they enabled people’s activities and movements to be digitally monitored 
and resulting patterns analysed through computer algorithms (Beer, 2013). Such systems 
were developed by companies mining vast digital data streams as they sought to identify 
risky bodies, doubtful transactions and suspicious movements. These techniques were 
trialled in Northern Ireland during the Troubles, in new shopping centres (such as the 
Metro or Trafford Centres) and in airports. They were then moved out and implemented 
within many British cities. There are nearly 2 million CCTV cameras, almost all of which 
are operated by private companies (CCTV User Group, 2013). This ‘digital dissection’ 
enabled the more detailed differentiation of various classes of the population. This 
generated what Graham and Marvin (2001) term a ‘splintering urbanism’. Access to 
different types of housing, workplace, transport infrastructures and leisure sites came to 
be stratified by relative income as measured by various digital markers. 
In the next section we briefly examine how lives in cities around the world developed over 
roughly this same period, especially noting developments in the developing world which 
is where the main growth of cities has been recently occurring.   
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3. World cities since the 1970s 
The development of UK cities between 1750 and 1950 was part of a wider process of 
urbanization in north America and Europe whereby the share of total population living in 
cities increased from around a tenth to over one half  (15 to 423 million) (Satterthwaite 
2007). Many cities developed similar patterns of urban living and, then during the second 
half of the twentieth century, also experienced deindustrialisation, suburbanization, inner 
city deprivation, gentrification, decline of the industrial workforce and the rise of service 
industry (Lash & Urry, 1987). In some places affected by the reduction of social welfare, 
there was increasing civil unrest (Elliott & Turner, 2012). American cities such as Los 
Angeles, Las Vegas, Miami, Detroit, Chicago and New York, often exemplified in 
academic, literary and cinematic accounts many of the hopes and anxieties about forms 
of city living during the second half of the last century (Zukin, 1993; Culver, 2010).   
However, some of the most significant developments during the last half-a-century 
occurred in the global South, especially Asia, during the second phase of urbanisation 
(Satterthwaite, 2007). In 1950 the world’s urban population was 732 million, more than 
half of which lived in Europe and North America and a third in Asia (see table 1). By 2010 
the world’s urban population had increased to 3.5 billion but the relative significance of 
these regions almost reversed with Europe and North America accounting for less than a 
quarter and Asia increasing to one half of the total global population (Lee, 2007).  
This shift was reflected in the number of large cities. In 1900 53 of the world’s 100 largest 
cities were in Europe. By 2000 only ten were in Europe. In the early 2000s three quarters 
of the 100 fastest-growing large cities were in Asia and Africa (none in Europe). In Asia, 
this meant the recovery of its historical role as the region with most of the world’s larger 
cities. In 1800 Asia possessed 64 of the largest 100 cities as India and China were the 
world’s two largest economies. By 2000 49 of the world’s largest cities were once again 
in Asia (Satterthwaite, 2007). 
Table 1:  Global population change, 1950-2010 
Region 1950 1970 1990 2000 2010* 
Africa 4.5 6.4 8.9 10.3 11.7 
Asia 32.0 36.5 44.5 47.9 50.5 
Europe 37.8 30.9 22.4 18.4 15.2 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
9.6 12.3 13.9 13.9 13.6 
Northern America 15.0 12.9 9.4 8.8 8.2 
Oceania 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 
Source: Satterthwaite 2007 (*estimated) 
It is thought that these trends will continue into the middle of the twenty-first century with 
the global urban population reaching 5.6 billion by 2040, and the developing regions 
accounting for 93 per cent of the growth (UNFPA, 2007). By 2030 developing regions 
were expected to host 80 per cent of the world’s urban population, most of which (seven 
out of ten) would be in Asia and Africa. In the period 2000 – 2030, the urban population 
in Asia was expected to grow from 1.4 to 2.6 billion, while in Africa it was likely to double 
(UNFPA, 2007).  
The background to this substantial growth of cities was the restructuring of the world 
economy with a dramatic fall in agriculture’s contribution, the emergence of newly 
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industrialised and export-oriented cities mainly in South East Asia, and the rise of a few 
‘global’ cities – centres of finance and highly specialised services performing the 
‘command functions’ of the new global economy (Sassen, 2001).  
During the last four decades changes in manufacturing and services had major 
implications for the international division of labour. Following a process of subdivision and 
subcontracting of production, many (relatively unskilled) manufacturing jobs in cities of 
the industrialised North migrated to cities in the developing regions, while cities in the 
global North maintained high value, knowledge- and industry-intensive functions of the 
production process.  
In developing regions, East Asian cities grew most especially through rapidly rising 
exports. In China in the 1980s the growth of export-oriented manufacturing cities was 
enabled by the designation of Special Economic Zones in Shenzhen, Shantou, Xiamen, 
Zhuhai, followed in 1984 by fourteen Economic and Technical Development Zones. 
These special status areas attracted foreign investment through suspending conventional 
taxation and labour regulations and through heavy investment in high-quality transport 
logistics (Zhu, 2004).  
But relatively few cities were able to adapt to these structural economic shifts and deploy 
similar development strategies, and whole regions with little access to investment capital, 
skilled workers and transport infrastructures became marginalised especially in sub-
Saharan Africa. However, in the 2000s and early 2010s cities in Brazil, India, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Turkey, Malaysia, Vietnam, South Africa, Ghana, and Uganda, developed 
sustained economic growth, as well as some reduction of inequalities and modest 
progress in terms of the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2013). 
A crucial difference between the first and the second waves of urbanisation involved the 
changing role of states. In the first wave the state came to provide widespread access to 
electricity, health, sanitation, water and transport infrastructures. They came to be 
regarded as public goods and an expression of a modern urban life. The state was core 
to urban lives. In the second wave of urbanisation the state was often viewed as more of 
a regulator than a provider, a view enforced by agencies such as the IMF and World 
Bank. The arrival of migrants from rural areas with immediate housing needs was then 
met by a retreat from state provision and the development of a profit-oriented private 
sector providing urban services. This meant that investment often focused on high-profit, 
low-risk projects leading to the rapid segmentation of conditions of urban living between 
the poor and those able to pay for such private services (Graham & Marvin, 2001).  
Such a ‘splintering urbanism’ was further accentuated by how many cities aspired to be 
globally competitive seeking to score high in the increasingly common ranking of cities. In 
their attempt to become a hub for knowledge-intensive firms, local governments with 
shrinking incomes tended to prioritise infrastructures that increased the connectivity of 
business, industrial districts and enclaves of professional knowledge workers, as 
opposed to providing basic services of water, sanitation, electricity and transport for the 
growing numbers of migrants and urban poor. There was the increasing juxtaposition of 
pockets of wealth and intense transnational connectivity sat alongside many expanding 
informal settlements of which the slum became the starkest expression. It is estimated 
that there are now around one billion slum dwellers (Davis, 2006).  
In many parts of the South informal settlements became common. For a significant part 
of the population in Asia and Africa living in cities was associated with informality. In the 
early 2000s Asian cities hosted half of the world’s slum population, while sub-Saharan 
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Africa had the highest rate of both urban growth (4.6 per cent) and slum growth (4.5 per 
cent) (UN-Habitat, 2003). Some analysts noted that in the coming decades all growth in 
slums would be located within the world’s developing regions.   
Living in slums had long been associated with poverty and marginality and analysts 
projected a dystopic future of failed slum cities throughout the global South. Davis indeed 
graphically writes of how: “the cities of the future, rather than being made out of glass 
and steel [….] are instead largely constructed out of crude brick, straw, recycled plastic, 
cement blocks, and scrap wood […] much of the twenty-first-century urban world squats 
in squalor, surrounded by pollution, excrement, and decay” (Davis, 2006, p.19). See 
Adey (2013) on the peculiar ‘atmosphere’ of life in the megacity.  
But by the end of the twentieth century researchers began to recognise that the habitus 
of the urban dispossessed was also marked by ingenuity, creativity, flexibility, 
pragmatism and entrepreneurialism. Rather than seeing slums as merely deprived 
reservoirs of idle labour, they began to be viewed as spaces of habitation, production, 
and politics, including even the basis for new kinds of slum tourism and ‘favela tours’ 
(Goldstein, 2003; Simone, 2010; Freire-Medeiros, 2013).  
Researchers were thus reluctant to subsume diverse and complex social and spatial 
realities under the term ‘slum’ (Roy, 2011). São Paulo illustrates these complex social 
and spatial dynamics between formal and informal settlements. Between 1940 and 1980 
the city expanded reinforcing the sharp contrast between a well-equipped city centre 
inhabited by the upper classes, and an expanding periphery of informal settlements 
occupied by migrants from Brazil’s northeast. From the late 1970s the fear of crime and 
violence led the middle and upper classes to abandon the city centre and to retreat into 
fortified enclaves (monitored spaces for residence, leisure and work) often right next to 
the favelas on the city outskirts where new business poles were also emerging. The 
image of a well-equipped city centre and a precarious periphery was reinforced by a stark 
proximity of wealth and destitution.  
At the same time the periphery became more heterogeneous with different levels of 
service provision and land and home ownership, from the most precarious, makeshift 
dwellings to upgraded settlements with road access, sewerage, sanitation and electricity 
often obtained after persistent pressure by social movements and NGOs working within 
the slums. Underlying these changes were rising levels of crime and a culture of fear 
reproduced through daily conversations and a media polarizing representations of 
inequality (including the simplification of the social and spatial complexity of the periphery 
under the pejorative term favela). There was the proliferation of walls, fences and barbed 
wire projecting a spectral image of a city literally and metaphorically under siege 
(Caldeira, 2000).  
In these cities issues of mobility were central to the processes of fragmentation shaping 
everyday life. Since the Second World War urban land area in developed countries 
doubled while in developing countries it increased fivefold through population growth and 
the sprawling growth of residential and commercial spaces (UN-Habitat, 2013). Over the 
last four decades the state retreated from providing public transport or, as in much of 
sub-Saharan Africa, existing services were disbanded. Middle and upper classes 
increasingly relied on the car, which was often seen as a safer mode of travel through an 
urban landscape perceived as hostile and violent. The number of new cars sold annually 
increased from 39 million in the 1990s to 63 million in 2012 (second-hand cars not 
included), a growing proportion of which were sold in Asia, which in 2012 accounted for 
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40 per cent of global sales. The number of cars within Brazilian metropoles doubled in a 
decade, reaching more than 21 million in 2012 (UN-Habitat, 2013). 
People without access to private cars or formal public transport had to walk or cycle, or 
use often dangerous informal motorised transport. Walking and cycling were the most 
common form of mobility in the global South, partly out of necessity and partly due to 
denser urban forms. However, while in many European and North American cities these 
mobility practices were beginning to be seen as an index of low carbon and healthy 
living, in the global South they were stigmatised and symbolised poverty and exclusion. 
In developing regions the spaces for walking and cycling shrank due to planning 
practices that favoured motorised mobility and sprawl. There were often no pavements or 
places of refuge and safety for those walking along the often disorganised streets of 
developing societies. 
Without much public transport, motorised mobilities were provided by the informal sector, 
often organised by the same criminal gangs controlling drugs and the arms trade within 
the vast informal settlements (Soweto’s population is 4 million for example). These 
informal mobilities were the main means of motorised movement. In many cities this 
informal transport may account for more than half of motorised trips and its significance 
continued to grow in the early 2010s.  
Nairobi (Kenya) had the highest per capita use of informal transport with matatu 
minibuses making 662 trips per inhabitant each year. This constituted three quarters of 
public transport trips and over one-third of traffic volume. In Harare (Zimbabwe) informal 
transport represented 90 per cent of the market. In Cairo (Egypt) shared taxis increased 
their share of motorised trips from 6 per cent in 1987 to 37 per cent in 2001. In 2013 
there were 15,000 unlicensed vans operating in Sao Paulo (Brazil) and since the 1990s 
10-15 passenger minibuses displaced private buses in Rio de Janeiro (UN-Habitat, 
2013).  
Much mobility occurs beyond the administrative boundaries of cities, partly reflecting and 
reinforcing old patterns of material and personal exchanges with more or less distant 
places, a reality intensified by recent processes of intra- and international migration and 
the new international division of labour. Over the last six decades migration from rural to 
urban areas within the developing world constituted the largest ever movement of people 
in human history (Saunders, 2011). This had profound effects on how cities were lived 
and imagined with multiple identities scattered across extensive geographies within and 
beyond each city. Urban life became infused with myriad references to, and borrowings 
from, other cultures, economies and ecologies (Blunt, 2005; Blunt & Bonnerjee, 2013).  
The growth of urban population was most visible in the rising number of megacities 
(those with more than 10 million inhabitants) and the stunning speed with which some 
such cities had grown. In 1950 only New York and Tokyo had a population over 10 
million. By 2012 there were 23 megacities and it was estimated that there would be 37 by 
2025 (UN-Habitat, 2013). Of these, all but eight will be in the developing world.  
Nevertheless despite the visibility and significance of megacities, most urban growth took 
place and was expected to continue to occur within smaller ‘ordinary cities’, the sort often 
ignored by the media or indeed by academics (Robinson, 2006). Furthermore, most 
predictions made about the size of large cities by 2000 proved incorrect partly because 
the links between urban growth and economic performance were insufficiently 
recognised.  
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During the twentieth century it appeared that economic performance was the main driver 
of urban growth, and economic success explained much urban growth in Southeast Asia. 
Yet over recent decades in Europe urban growth was small or even negative in some 
places, with many smaller cities and areas that could be described as ‘semi-rural’ 
enjoying sustained economic growth. Thus economic success did not necessarily 
generate ever-growing urban centres (Satterthwaite, 2007).  
Some successful cities in the new global economy developed ‘extreme’ forms of 
urbanism, such as Dubai (Davis & Monk, 2007) and Shanghai (Gidley, 2010). Life in 
these cities was partly defined by the unprecedented speed of social, economic and 
architectural change. In Dubai developments included two palm islands extending the 
coastline by 120 kilometres; a string of new islands shaped like the world; vast shopping 
complexes; a domed ski resort and other major sports venues; the world’s tallest 
building, the Burj Khalifa; the world’s largest hotel, the Asia-Asia with 6500 rooms; the 
world’s the first 7 star hotel, the Burj Al Arab; and world’s largest single urban 
development. Dubai is the world centre of monumental excess with more or less no 
planning regulation and based upon the supply of poor workers imported from Asia who 
possess almost no rights (Urry, 2013b). 
Shanghai’s three decades of persistently high economic growth had been generated by 
manufacturing but in the 2000s the city rapidly moved towards advanced service 
industries (Keith et al., 2013). About 20 million square metres of new space were 
expected to be built every year. This involved expanding living space per person 
(doubling since 1990 to 15 square metres per resident in 2003). By the mid-2000s the 
city was still dense with about half of Shanghai’s population living in an area covering 
less than 5% of its surface area. In 1980 there were no skyscrapers in Shanghai but by 
the end of the 2000s there were said to be twice as many as in New York. Although 
cycling is still significant (30% of all trips in the late 2000s), there were active 
governmental policies to limit it, facilitating car-based social practices (LSE Cities, 2005; 
Urry, 2013b).  
Cities characterised by high density living were often seen and imagined as places of 
poor health and low quality of life. However, research suggests a more complex picture. 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century cities offered some of the worst and some of 
the best environments for healthy living. Those living in large and dense wealthy Asian 
cities such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Tokyo enjoyed long life expectancy. Overall 
data showed a health benefit from living in cities (in terms of child mortality and 
malnutrition) partly due to the concentration of health infrastructures (Dye, 2008; Meyer, 
2013).  
However, more detailed data showed that the urban poor were often not counted within 
these censuses. When they were included, stark differences within cities were masked 
by the process of ‘averaging’ (Burdett & Taylor, 2011). For example, Hong Kong scored 
high in various health indicators despite having a very high urban density. However, 
significant variation existed between the wealthy residential areas and peripheral 
populations living in ‘cage-homes’ (some 800,000 people).  
There was also strong evidence of how inadequate infrastructures generated infectious 
diseases. Slum dwellers were especially vulnerable to communicable diseases, malaria, 
respiratory and gastrointestinal diseases as compared with other urban dwellers, but 
addressing this was as much a matter of better infrastructures as of new practices. The 
urban advantage of living in cities in terms of health diminished when these 
socioeconomic factors were controlled for (Satterthwaite, 2011; Meyer, 2013). Other 
16 
commentators also argued that the health advantage of living in cities may be 
compromised by the dramatic increase in connectivity by land and air travel between 
cities and between cities and tropical forests hosting some yet unknown, highly 
transmissible viruses with relatively long incubation periods (Wolfe, 2011).  
While megacities were often associated with poor living conditions, new city rankings 
examining the quality of life directed attention to cities that managed to decouple 
wellbeing from high resource use. Many of these cities possessed good and reliable 
public transport, high human density, and high quality public spaces facilitating walking 
and face-to-face encounters. Montgomery (2013) shows how these contribute to 
producing what he provocatively terms ‘happy cities’.  
Some cities gained a reputation as places of hope that inspired similar transformations 
happening elsewhere. Curitiba in southern Brazil developed a four-decade experience of 
integrating urban planning with transportation. 70 per cent of commuters used the Bus 
Rapid Transit (BRT) system. Compared with other Brazilian cities, Curitiba consumes 30 
per cent less fuel per capita, and users of the BRT spend a smaller portion of their 
income upon transport (UN-Habitat, 2013). Curitiba inspired similar initiatives in many 
cities of the developing world, such as Bogotá in Colombia (UN-Habitat, 2013).  
Vancouver (Canada) is another example where long-term planning, a fifteen-year long 
investment in multimodal transport, and an open attitude towards migrants made it lively 
and culturally diverse. It was characterised by high density, many face-to-face 
encounters, and extensive possibilities for walking through extensive public spaces. 
Many of its tall, slender buildings were mixed-use so as to ensure that streets within the 
city centre were still lively in the evening (Glaeser, 2011; Montgomery, 2013).  
The idea that cities could become ‘intelligent’ places and more efficiently address 
transport, health, energy and water supply and economic development gained 
prominence by the early 2000s. Since then many cities have been blanketed with digital 
devices providing a flexible, almost sentient infrastructural basis for new forms of identity, 
communication, mobility, business and cultural production (Kitchin & Dodge 2011).  
Although in most cities sentient environments involved retrofitting existing built 
infrastructures, some brand new cities such as Masdar in Abu Dhabi and the business 
district of Songdo in South Korea attracted much media attention. These expensive, 
living laboratories were criticised for privileging a centralised, top down approach to 
developing networked infrastructures and neglecting other ways in which technology and 
the environment can come together to facilitate livelier and more resilient urban lives 
(Sassen, 2013). 
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4. Future city lives 
In this section we examine four possible transformations of city lives over the next few 
decades. We think it necessary to ‘think’ out possible future city system which means not 
merely extrapolating from existing trends. However, current trends are useful in 
envisaging some elements of the ways in which future cities will be structured. We avoid 
here the language of ‘drivers’ of the future since this does insufficient justice to the 
systemic, emergent character of possible future cities. 
Figure 1:  City futures scenarios 
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We term these possible city futures high tech city, digital city, liveable city and fortress 
city (see figure 1). We examine the conditions that would mean that by 2050 one or other 
of these was dominant in the UK and/or around the world. It should also be noted that 
none of these city futures is simply the ‘best’ or ‘ideal’. All involve significant personal and 
social costs. There is no future city which resolves all contradictions. These notions of 
future cities have in part been derived from previous formulations of future scenarios, 
such as, Costanza 1998; Foresight, 2006; Urry, 2013b; and Forum for the Future, 2013.  
The nineteenth and early twentieth century saw the spreading of the ‘industrial city’, while 
the ‘post-industrial city’ became common in the latter part of the last century. We 
consider which of these four new ‘cities’ will become the dominant city model by the mid-
twenty first century? We take 2050 as our end-point partly to relate our analysis to the 
time-scale used by Porritt in The World We Made, an innovative attempt to imagine one 
possible future (2013). 
We especially emphasise the importance of how ‘movement’ is organised and resourced 
within future cities. If there is something special about cities it is that they are 
characterised by an exceptional scale of connections, networks and flows of people, 
information and objects (Bridge & Watson, 2011) - see Graham & Thrift (2007) on cities 
as centres of repair and maintenance. Cities are places of multiple contested mobilities, 
of intense, overlapping and resource-dependent flows. Underlying that movement is 
energy: ‘much of the city’s existence is concerned with energy flows taking place on 
different levels: from water and sewage through to electricity and information, from 
people and animals, to machines and vegetables’ (Amin & Thrift, 2002).  
In particular the dynamism of modern city lives experienced on the go depends upon the 
‘liquid civilisation’ of oil. What will develop in future cities depends upon what happens to 
these flows and in particular to oil, its price and supply and the degree to which its 
burning will be constrained by future climate change policies (see Carbon Tracker 2013; 
Berners Lee & Clark, 2013). Former Government Chief Scientific Adviser David King 
maintains that oil shortages and price rises engendered the financial crash that began in 
oil-dependent sub-prime American suburbs in the mid-2000s (see Murray & King 2012; 
Rubin, 2009; Urry, 2013b). All four scenarios outlined below deal in different ways with 
the problematic future of oil and other resources upon which mobile city lives utterly 
depend. 
High-tech city 
Figure 2:  The high-tech city 
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This city involves people experiencing ever-more speedy and extensive mobile lives 
(Elliott & Urry 2010), see figure 2. People would be on the move within cities and very 
rapidly between them. The forms, scale and intensity of globalisation will be much 
enhanced. Current futuristic cities emerging in developing societies, such as Shanghai, 
Dubai, Qatar, Hong Kong, Rio, Seoul, and Singapore, will provide models of desirable 
urban development around the globe.   
Movement is central to each people’s ‘persona’. Social status is acquired through one’s 
own travel and consumption as well as that of one’s children and friends. Average 
citizens travel for up to four to five hours a day rather than the hour or so at present 
(known as the ‘constant travel time’ hypothesis). Astonishing new consumer experiences 
become globally available as the planet really does develop into a supermarket of goods, 
services and friendships. Much work, friendship, family life and leisure activities occur ‘on 
the move’ with many ‘devices’ making most aspects of location almost irrelevant to daily 
experience. Education and work are globalised with much on-line but also with rapid 
frequent movement so ‘talk’ can happen; cities according to Amin & Thrift (2002) ‘hum 
with talk’ and this will be so especially in the high tech city. 
We can anticipate the further growth of ‘coffices’ as sites for meetings and itinerant work 
(Garside 2014). Organisations are already facilitating informal ‘unoffices’ or ‘jelly’, where 
spontaneous meetingness can take place amongst casual co-workers. People meet for 
face-to-face engagements with multi-sensory communication. Carefully choreographed 
spaces not unlike airport lounges or hotel foyers will enable brief exchanges within ever-
more extensive, fragmented and accelerated ‘mobile lives’.   
Such cities would exploit the potential of the space above the city’s surface (Bridge, 
2013; Elden, 2013). The high tech city would be more vertical and increasingly orbited by 
many kinds of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles. Already helicopters are 
commonplace in contemporary Sao Paulo and some other cities so that richer residents 
and visitors can avoid the traffic and crime down below (Cwerner, 2009; Budd, 2013).  
Many light personal vehicles are now available and legally permitted within urban areas. 
Micro-light flying is a familiar sight on urban fringes as a form of extreme leisure 
(Laviolette, 2012). Space-scrapers might come to be built so large that they would 
require aerial vehicles and other vertical forms of transport to access them (Lehto, 2013).  
Recently Amazon has speculated about the possibilities of using drones to distribute their 
packages to customers. Freight could thus travel above the city so reducing surface 
traffic. Overall unmanned drones are getting smaller, with some are even designed to 
mimic the flight characteristics of insects such as hawk moths. These micro-drones have 
come in from the pages of science fiction and are getting up close, even being able to 
land on a window sill. Drones will also be increasingly able to swarm and so the high tech 
city will involve airspace as much as road space. Also regular trips into space via 
whatever Virgin Galactic spaceships morph into over the next few decades will become 
commonplace (space travel insurance is already available - see The Local, 2011). 
It is also possible that vertical farms made up of high rise towers could house animals 
and crops rather than just people (Despommier, 2009). The push for verticality in urban 
planning and infrastructure design will be generally driven by elites, keen to escape the 
masses through unhindered aerial mobilities and high-rise living. Increasing social 
inequality is likely to bolster the desire for and development of the vertical high tech city. 
This kind of city will though only develop through the emergence of a new post-carbon 
energy system innovated and implemented around the world. Such a system would 
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enable the mobilities of peoples and objects to be so much more extensive and frequent. 
Doomsday futures turn out to be wrong and some problems of future energy supply and 
climate change can be fixed through a new zero emissions sociotechnical energy system 
(Geels, forthcoming). High tech city requires such a new system emerging and spreading 
fast upon a global scale. 
Such a system to move people and objects on the scale necessary to replace the energy 
provided by oil would need to be present now at least in embryo form. It would have to be 
similar in scale and significance to what followed the world’s first oil gusher that occurred 
at Spindletop, Texas, in 1901. That gusher led to the dramatic upscaling of ‘mobile’ lives 
and large cities over the course of the last century, enabling the vast development of oil-
based cars, trucks, aircraft, and military and container ships (oil accounts for 95% of 
transportation energy – Urry, 2013b).  
Historically new clusters of socio-technical systems take decades to go global. In order to 
develop a new system of mobility for cities to impact within the next two decades this 
system must be already developing. The US National Intelligence Council (2008) 
summarises the time-scale involved here: “An energy transition from one type of fuel 
(fossil fuels) to another (alternative) is an event that historically has only happened once 
a century at most with momentous consequences” (p.xii). Any new system likely to make 
such a future high tech city by 2050 would need to be well-established and gaining global 
traction within the next couple of decades. 
The only possible energy form that by 2050 that could substitute for oil in terms of 
transportation energy is hydrogen power. Indeed a decade ago it looked as though 
hydrogen would be the basis of a major alternative to oil, gas and coal. Hydrogen makes 
up 75% of the universe and in theory could provide a virtually unlimited source of 
especially transportation energy (within a broader post-fossil fuel mix). Rifkin (2002) 
described the hydrogen economy as an ‘energy elixir’ producing zero emissions. Many 
research programmes began in the 1990s exploring how hydrogen could provide this 
alternative energy system. Companies developed large hydrogen research teams and 
certain city governments set about becoming hydrogen-based (Chicago, Hawaii). In 1999 
Iceland announced that it would be the first ‘hydrogen society’. Significant research 
expertise was built up to develop the high tech city organised around hydrogen power. 
However, hydrogen is not a free floating resource like fossil fuels. Hydrogen is an energy 
carrier that is more like electricity; it has to be produced, stored and distributed. At least 
half the hydrogen so far produced as energy required natural gas. There are non-carbon 
forms of hydrogen production but so far these are many times more expensive and rarely 
used (Romm, 2004).  
Hydrogen can either be used within a fuel cell or can be ‘pumped’ directly at filling 
stations as a gas or as a liquid. The hydrogen fuel cell used in a vehicle system is 
basically a box that takes in hydrogen and oxygen and produces electricity and water as 
outputs. Fuel cells convert energy through a chemical reaction and produce electricity 
similar to how a battery functions. This development promises near-zero carbon 
emissions. Unlike batteries, fuel cells are not recharged and produce energy for as long 
as the fuel is provided. The type suitable for transport is known as a proton exchange 
membrane fuel cell and requires very pure hydrogen. Current models, however, supply 
the hydrogen from converted natural gas or oil with an energy efficiency of around 35-
40% which is similar to an internal combustion engine (Lichterman & Seetharaman, 
2013).  
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If hydrogen is directly pumped a whole new production and distribution infrastructure is 
required in cities. The pipelines would also need to allow for high leakage and for the 
tendency for hydrogen to evaporate. At room temperature hydrogen takes up more space 
than normal petrol fuel. Cylinders would thus have to contain a gas that is prone to 
leaking and to withstand all high-impact crashes. Another way to transport hydrogen 
would be in liquefied form in tankers but because liquefaction of hydrogen occurs at the 
astonishingly cold temperature of -253C, refrigerating the gas in this way is hugely 
expensive.  
There is thus no doubt that hydrogen-based cities would require exceptional levels of 
investment by both the private and public sectors, as well as many further innovations 
including future aircraft and ships being hydrogen-based. A hydrogen-based city would 
need really massive rebuilding, while the existing oil/gas infrastructure and vehicle would 
become relatively valueless. 
Other commentators examined whether nuclear energy could substitute for oil. However, 
the oil currently burnt each year mainly for transportation energy is equivalent to the 
energy annually produced by 2500 nuclear power stations. There are currently only 
around 400 such stations with many coming to the end of their economic life; and after 
Fukushima there is little likelihood that new ones are going to be built on such a scale 
(Vadén, 2010). This would also necessitate an extensive reengineering of transport 
systems towards electric vehicles. Nuclear energy may become more extensive but there 
is no doubt that it would entail increased surveillance of populations so as to prevent the 
risky sabotage of nuclear power plants. 
 
Digital city 
Figure 3:  The digital city 
 
Digital cities would involve the widespread substitution of the physical movement of 
objects and people by many forms of digital communications and experiences, see figure 
3. In this future ‘digital lives’ could develop into life instead, so that there is very little need 
for travel. Software would ‘intelligently’ work out the best means of undertaking tasks, such 
as meeting up, getting to some place or event, or bringing the activity to fruition through 
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virtual connections. Overall digital worlds would be utterly central to work, friendship and 
social life.  
 
This would entail a very dramatic change in the nature of cities. So far many different kinds 
of ‘meetings’ are held in cities that are essential for human life. Crucial to meetings is talk 
along with food, drink, music and a shared space. Certain cities are thought to be 
conducive to particular kinds of meetings. Such meetings enable ‘tacit knowledge’ to 
develop, the kind of knowledge that is not easily codified. According to Storper (2013) 
such co-presence and its role in coordination is central to city lives. Cities gain their ‘buzz’ 
in part because of the scale of collegial, family and friendship miles that are travelled to 
realise such co-presence (Elliott & Urry, 2010). But establishing and maintaining meetings 
is costly in terms of money, time and the emotional work involved in terms of often very 
lengthy and tiring travel.  
 
In the digital city there would be nothing special about these ‘physical meetings’ and the 
sites for those meetings. Thus people would say that we can know someone although they 
had never ‘met’ them, never shaken their hand nor kissed them on the cheek. Rather the 
virtual meeting would be regarded as good as meeting face-to-face. Likewise people 
would be able to say we have been in a particular place because they had ‘travelled’ there 
virtually and that it was felt to be as good as the ‘real thing’. By the middle of this century 
immersive environments will effectively simulate meetings and the experiences of other 
places (Amin & Thrift, 2002; Montgomery, 2013). Moreover, physical environments would 
themselves be ‘smart’, so producing a convergence of the real and the digital. Such a 
smart background senses, adapts to and transforms people’s lives more interactively, 
especially as people move around urban environments (Cooper, 2010).  
 
We might also anticipate that meetings occur in which both physically present members 
and ‘telecommuting’ distant members operating remote-control ‘doubles’ in real-time 
participate (Weiss, 2012). Doubles project the controller’s face onto a small tablet or 
display screen and utilise an on-board video camera to stream events live providing a 
microphone and outward video-camera for two-way correspondence. The double moves 
about the physical space and interacts with other participants, both virtual and physical. 
The emulation of meetingness is also made possible by ubiquitous energy charging 
facilities that allow doubles to move around the urban space spontaneously and without 
interruption or disconnection due to sentient amenities including ‘smart’ furniture, 
pavements and utilities (Shepard, 2011).  
 
Some forerunners of this digital city are to be seen in the practices of young people in the 
global north. Central to rising car use in the past was the tendency for each new 
generation (especially young men) to be more licensed to drive and more likely to own a 
car. But now owning a car is less valued than owning a smartphone. It is digital lives that 
seem increasingly significant to young people (Geels et al., 2012). German research 
shows that the car is no longer a ‘must-have’ status symbol (Siemens, 2011). In the US, 
46% of 18 to 24-year-olds would choose good internet access over owning their own car, 
while this is true for only 15% for baby boomers (Wheeler, 2011).  
 
A digital city would be one based around living ‘on the screen’ as Turkle (1995) expresses 
it. The typical American citizen now spends eight and a half hours a day looking at 
screens, often more than one at a time (Carr, 2010). Each screen can interrupt the other 
so there is little enduring thinking; digital cities will involve lives of multiple interfaces, 
multitasking and overloading. Digital lives seem already to be altering human brains which 
will increasingly undertake many different kinds of tasks simultaneously (Carr, 2010). 
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Various futurists expect that by the middle of this century there will have been an 
exceptional ‘intelligence explosion’, what some refer to as the ‘singularity’ when the 
computing power of all computers exceeds that of all human brains (Kurzweil, 2006). This 
argument draws on Moore's Law, that computing power doubles every eighteen months. 
Kurzweil maintains that computer processing capacity will soon outstrip that of the human 
brain and that humanity and technology will merge with advances in computing, genetics, 
nanotechnology and robotics.  
 
Digital cities will also build digital security into their infrastructures through ubiquitous 
computing and a ‘sea of sensors’. Individual behaviour will be monitored and identified, as 
people leave ‘traces’ of movements, purchases, communications and their lives. And as 
databases are interdependent, so it will be possible to piece together separate digital 
traces of which there will be thousands per day for each person. Thus each person in the 
digital city will be remade as a reintegrated ‘digital’ self across different databases 
stemming from billions of computers and sensors, some of which can be as small as smart 
dust. There could be a network of one trillion sensors covering the world and delivering 
data to anyone who ‘needs’ it (Siegele, 2010; Graham, 2011). But with more devices, 
there is more vulnerability of systems with few firewalls erected between them and 
subsequently major possibilities of system breakdown (Eisen, 2014). 
 
We might also think that with the digital city many people will no longer live in ‘cities’ as 
such but will visit them fleetingly. We can expect a trend of ‘counter-urbanization’ where 
some in the digital city might no longer to live anywhere in particular. The Bufalino, 
designed by Cornelius Comanns, is a single-person apartment on wheels within a three-
wheel economic and fuel-efficient vehicle designed for digital nomads. Also there are 
capsule hotels, first introduced in Japan for long-haul commuters, enabling affordable, 
brief bursts of city living (Macdonald, 2000). People might live in various places in a 
distributed fashion, commuting semi-regularly and also productively. People would rely on 
co-present digital technologies for communication, such as remote control doubles that 
utilise the latest camera and network technologies alongside telepresence and digital 
avatars to emulate meetingness. People may not commute daily or weekly, but instead 
elect to dwell in personal mobile homes, as the city becomes a stop on a journey rather 
than a destination. 
 
Driverless (or ‘digital’) cars also point to experiences where the productive use of time in 
transit supersedes the often taxing task of driving (Laurier & Dant, 2012). Indeed, car 
computerization to ‘drive-by-wire’ offers many benefits for irregular commuters in this world 
beyond the avoidance of accidents from human error. Driverless cars would reduce fatigue 
in long-haul commutes and at the same time offer options for commuters to make their 
travel time productive (Sharon, 1983). Driverless cars could develop into places for 
meeting as people are freed from operating the vehicle, although obviously this requires 
some new source of transportation energy (BBC, 2014). 
 
A crucial element of the digital city would involve the new manufacturing system often 
known as 3D printing. This was initially developed during the 1980s and 1990s to produce 
prototypes of an object before tooling up a workshop or factory to produce thousands or 
more copies of the ‘real’ object. As 3D printing developed, it was realised that many 
shapes and materials could be produced in quantity and not just one-off prototypes. 
Something like one-fifth of additive manufacturing is now of final products and this will 
rapidly increase (The Economist, 2011). Such a digital manufacturing system has potential 
cost savings: customising objects for particular consumers, printing or manufacturing on 
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demand, being able to make small modifications to products at almost zero cost, saving on 
raw materials since little gets thrown away, the local adaptation of design so as to suit 
particular environments, and significant possibilities of recycling both unused powder and 
existing objects.  
 
But the biggest transformation here is that objects can be manufactured close to or even 
by consumers with their own ‘printer’ (Birtchnell & Urry, 2013). 3D printing shops could 
proliferate on streets, on high streets and shopping centres. There would be the much 
greater localisation of manufacturing within cities. For some products the capacity to scan 
the object and then make endless copies by or near consumers would produce large cost 
savings and reduce transport-related emissions and oil use, assuming that roughly the 
same number of products was manufactured worldwide.  
 
The widespread growth of 3D printing could turn the high street into a more of a 
manufacturing street and this would transform lives within cities. Cities would once again 
hum to the sound of many kinds of manufacturing, as envisaged in Anderson’s, 2012, The 
Makers (Birtchnell & Urry, 2013). This would be a little like the way in which manufacturing 
was organised within cities in the early years of the industrial revolution in northern 
Europe. 
 
Liveable city 
Figure 4:  The liveable city 
 
The ‘liveable’ city involves lives based upon a dramatic ‘powering down’ that reduce the 
carbon footprint of residents, see figure 4. This city future would develop from often local 
innovation in thinking and practice undertaken by scientists, NGOs, entrepreneurs and 
think tanks. High energy movement machines would be much less significant. This city 
would involve more of a less connected, smaller scale system of neighbourhoods, indeed 
a fragmentation of cities into neighbourhoods. Those cities based upon a ‘centre-sprawl’ 
model would go into decline. The transition towns programme developed in The Transition 
Companion documents the necessary stages of such an ‘energy descent’ within towns 
and cities. The process should be viral, open source, self-organising, iterative and fun 
according to Hopkins (2011), the ‘founder’ of the transition movement (Social Life, 2014).  
 
Such a powered down city would be one with reasonable levels of wellbeing although in 
terms of normal economic measures most people would be measurably ‘poorer’. There is 
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much difficulty in measuring ‘hidden wealth’, such as good social interactions or low 
carbon lives that is not effectively captured by the growth or decline of a city’s share of 
GDP (Halpern, 2010). GDP measures the sum of measurable market transactions and this 
figure can rise even though some of what is counted is unproductive of individual 
wellbeing and the environment. Such transactions do not represent high levels of 
wellbeing, as interestingly shown in the video which shows how the ‘good life’ is not the 
same as the ‘goods life’ (YouTube, 2011). Indeed increases in GDP can go along with 
worsening emissions and reducing levels of happiness and well-being. Hence efforts have 
been made to develop alternative measure of what makes a liveable city such as the 
happy planet index (Happy Planet Index, 2012).  
 
Liveable cities would involve re-designing places to lessen energy use especially for 
transportation through enabling various social practices on a much smaller scale. This 
redesign must foster higher density living, heighten the use of slow travel alternatives and 
shift towards social practices that are more local and smaller in scale. This could, as 
Latouche (2009) brings out, provide more opportunity for face-to-face talk and maintaining 
good relations with others.  
 
Many studies following Jacobs’ (1992) The Death and Life of Great American Cities show 
the attractions of neighbours living close together, residences mixing with businesses and 
the lack of zoning, much use of slow modes of travel and an absence of extreme 
differences in income and wealth of those living near to each other. Sprawl creates sprawl. 
‘Post-suburban’ social lives need to develop, systematically reversing the processes that 
generated ‘sprawl’ (Owen, 2011). Owen argues that the greenest city in the US is New 
York (or at least Manhattan) since it provides many local connections while making it 
almost impossible to own and use private cars. He advocates a threefold policy for 
promoting green metropolises: to live smaller, to live closer, and to drive less. Long 
commutes are bad for almost all aspects of social life and so reducing the scale and 
impact of commuting is essential (Putnam, 2001; Montgomery, 2013). 
 
In such a liveable city there would be many, dense forms of localised movement, a mixed 
flow of slow-moving micro-cars, bikes, hybrid vehicles, electric bikes and pedestrians, with 
mass transport integrated into networks of physical and virtual access. Vehicles would be 
electronically connected through information, payment systems and physical access with 
collective or mass forms of transport (Owen, 2011). Examples of schemes that could be 
scaled up include Vélib’, Autolib’, Zipcar, CAR2GO and so on.  
 
Liveable cities thus presuppose all its elements powering down and reinforcing each other 
in a virtuous circle. Friends would be chosen from neighbouring streets, families would not 
move away at times of new household formation, households would not live apart and any 
distant family members could not be regularly visited. In such a city status would be re-
localised and based upon contributions that people made locally. High status in a liveable 
city would need to stem from not possessing extensive connections with others around the 
world. Re-engineering the nature of ‘success’ in societies involves emphasising the 
achievements of those living relatively ‘local lives’, being what we can call ‘local heroes’ 
(Urry, 2013a).  
 
This requires analysis of the complex social organisation and alternative normative 
structure that liveable cities would develop over the next few years (Peters, Fudge & 
Jackson, 2010). There would have to be many transformations across all systems, 
enhancing what Jackson (2009) characterises as the ‘capabilities for flourishing’ rather 
than ‘income’. Many analyses such as Montgomery’s (2013) Happy City detail how that 
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after a certain level of income has been reached extra goods, services and income 
generated within unequal cities generate more unhappiness and less capacity for 
‘flourishing’. Thus extra resources are in effect ‘wasted’. There is a happiness paradox. 
 
There are various examples of liveable cities where some social practices have been 
effectively downsized and localised. These cities include parts or aspects of Bogotá, 
Copenhagen, Curitiba, Delft, Hong Kong, Portland, Totnes, Vancouver and Växjö (Owen, 
2011; Montgomery, 2013). For example, Bogotá has developed many innovations 
including central areas of streets for bikes and pedestrians with cars located at the 
margins. Copenhagen developed an infrastructure which protects cyclists from road users. 
Delft initiated the shared-space concept. Vancouver as noted above has the lowest carbon 
footprint of any major north American city through high density building, little sprawl, many 
journeys being by bike, feet or public transport, and the provision of many green spaces 
and open views.  
 
Växjö is developing a ‘fossil fuel free future’ in the context of a national plan that involves 
‘Making Sweden an oil-free Society’ by 2020. It is almost halfway there without sacrificing 
lifestyle, comfort or economic growth. In the underground car park of local government, 
there are no private vehicles, just a communal green-car fleet. Staff who cycle or take the 
local biogas buses to work book ahead for the green-car fleet. Carbon emissions in 
Sweden are heavily taxed since the plan is to reach zero carbon emissions within the next 
few decades (Government Offices of Sweden, 2006).  
 
Part of this process has been developing low carbon living around ‘green’ spaces, 
community gardens, and nature corridors. Indeed we might anticipate rewilding being 
introduced into urban settings to encourage biodiversity within the urban core. Liveable 
cities somehow manage to introduce ‘green’ spaces and more diverse flora and fauna 
while keeping cities relatively dense and avoiding sprawl. Neighbourhoods would be 
crucial site for city lives that would be less obviously ‘urban’. 
 
Fortress city 
Figure 5:  The fortress city 
 
The Fortress City is one where the development of ‘gated societies’ is taken to the 
extreme, see figure 5. Richer societies would break away from the poorer into fortified 
enclaves. Those able to live in gated and armed encampments would do so, with much 
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privatising of what were once at least in some societies, public or collective functions 
(Leichenko, Thomas & Baines, 2010; Graham, 2010).  
 
Those outside the enclaves would be living in ‘wild zones’ which the rich and powerful 
would pass through or over as fast as possible. Systems of secured long range mobility 
would disappear except those used by the super-rich. Those outside the enclaves would 
be unable or unwilling to travel far. Long distance travel would be risky and probably only 
undertaken if people or machines were armed. The rich would mainly travel in the air in 
armed helicopters or light aircraft, a pattern prefigured in Sao Paulo (Cwerner, 2009). This 
future involves ‘fortressed’ walled cities and an extensive ‘security-isation’ of populations, 
similar in some ways to cities in the medieval period which provided protection against 
raiders, invaders and diseases. 
 
Thus in such a city, as futurists Gallopin et al. (1997) argued: “the elite retreat to protected 
enclaves, mostly in historically rich nations, but in favoured enclaves in poor nations, as 
well […] Pollution is also exported outside the enclaves, contributing to the extreme 
environmental deterioration induced by the unsustainable practices of the desperately 
poor and by the extraction of resources for the wealthy’ (p.34). Versions of this can be 
seen in the contemporary world with the ‘offshoring’ of waste and emissions to poorer, 
developing societies (Urry, 2014). 
 
In this ‘barbaric’ future, oil, gas and water shortages and intermittent wars would 
undermine production, mobility, energy and communication connections and critical 
infrastructures (Froggatt & Lahn, 2010). Given energy shortages many infrastructural 
systems would collapse with increasing separation of production and consumption 
between different regions. There would be the increasingly localised recycling of bikes, 
cars, trucks, computers and phone systems. Much of the time these systems would not 
work with little capacity within such cities to organise systems of ‘repair’ (Graham & Thrift, 
2007). The infrastructure would be left to rust away when it no longer worked. 
 
Such an energy-starved city would involve a falling standard of living, the ever-greater 
focus upon the ‘products’ of the increasingly privatised security industry, probable re-
localisation of mobility patterns, towns and cities built for visitors deteriorating into ghost 
towns, and an increasing frequency of resource-related wars. These would be increasing 
frequency of what have been described as ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, Karl & Said, 2007). These 
involve private mercenaries as well as statist military forces; de-professionalised armies 
(sometimes made up of ‘boys’); the use of weapons bought through the market/internet; 
an asymmetry of military force with no fixed ‘fronts’ or treaties and peace processes; the 
military targeting of civilians through inter alia suicide bombing and drone attacks; the role 
of warlords who combine entrepreneurial and military skills; and the tendency for such 
wars to last interminable periods of time. Lives in the fortress city would be conducted with 
the continuous spectre of warfare, of the militarisation of young men and the raping of 
women and girls a constant threat to a decent life. 
 
These new wars would develop in the context of failing states where there is no monopoly 
of physical coercion in the hands of legitimate national states, especially given the growth 
of ‘private warlords’ (Woodbridge 2004). Such new wars are especially likely around 
energy and related resources, involving states, corporations, NGOs, terrorists and many 
other non-state networks. And new wars make states more likely to fail and render the 
conditions for extracting, transporting and refining resources exceptionally troublesome 
(this would reduce effective energy reserves even further). 
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This is a kind of ‘neo-Medievalist’ vision of cities of the future. As in the Middle Ages, there 
would be little democracy, limited powers of states to govern legitimately, many non-state 
bodies with a mix of military and ideological powers, much illegal movement of peoples 
across borders, various empires, many new wars and intense conflict over scarce 
resources. City lives would be as in Hobbes’s Leviathan: “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short [when ‘place-hacking the [apocalyptic] city’]” (Garrett, 2013, p.60-1). 
 
Former NASA scientist Lovelock (2006) rather similarly asked of the future: ‘is our 
civilization doomed, and will this century mark its end with a massive decline in population, 
leaving a few survivors in a torrid society ruled by warlords on a hostile and disabled 
planet?” (p.151) Lovelock along with others thus points to the generalised ‘peaking’ of oil, 
gas and water, as well as ‘western life’ more generally that seems to be occurring in the 
early years of this century. These shortages will make economic production and social 
lives more local than appeared likely during the increasingly mobile twentieth century. 
 
Mad Max 2 depicted such a dystopian violent future. This movie was conceived of 
following the 1973 OPEC oil price rise when various doom-laden futures were envisaged 
in the ‘west’. This movie presented a vision of a bleak impoverished city facing 
breakdowns of civil order resulting from oil and other shortages. Power rested with those 
able to access oil or to improvise new mobilities such as being able to get airborne (see 
Budd, 2013, on the growing significance of private air travel).  
 
Some commentators argue that the rise and dramatic fall of Detroit is a harbinger of such 
developments. By the 1950s, the city was home to almost 2 million people with very many 
employed within the American car industry. But Detroit’s population has now fallen to less 
than 750,000 and has been described as a forgotten place. The film/DVD Detroit: The Last 
Days shows rusting hulks of abandoned car plants, empty freeways, blackened corpses of 
burnt out houses, trees sprouting from the tops of deserted skyscrapers, half the children 
living below the poverty line, and almost half adults functionally illiterate (Temple, 2010).  
 
This may thus provide lessons as to what might unfold more generally if fortresses get 
established elsewhere, while places like Detroit are left to die. Indeed places left to die 
may be subject to a ‘rewilding’. The city is not only ‘multicultural’ but also ‘multinatural’ 
(Lorimer, 2012). We might anticipate the spreading of many ‘invasive species’ that are 
dangerous for urban liveability. Innovations could permit the growth of a rewilded ‘urban 
jungle’. This future world would involve herbivores to predators living within the midst of 
the city outside the fortress and contributing to the extensive rewildness of such zones 
(Monbiot, 2013).  
 
Even more striking is the possibility of four-limb, battery-powered ‘walkers’. US company 
Boston Dynamics are progressing with their robotic ‘mammal bionic quadruped’ walkers 
(Ackerman, 2011). These robots as well as others are modelled on animal movements 
and can through sensors and artificial intelligence self-correct their patterns of movement 
in response to their environment (Li et al., 2011). Also able to carry heavy payloads these 
‘mammal bionic quadruped’ walkers could transport humans, enclosed or not, across 
variable terrains and be more conducive to wild landscapes, allowing interaction with 
predators and de-domesticated animals outside the fortress city.   
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5. Living in the city 
In this paper we documented some ways in which living in the city has been organised 
and reorganised over the past few centuries. Obviously this is a vast topic and we have 
been selective in our treatment. And we have had to range over many different 
determinants of such lives, considering the energy, engineering, design, economic and 
political bases of life in cities within Britain and elsewhere. The paper tries to address at 
each historical stage the movements of people, objects and communications; the 
changing nature and location of work; forms of leisure, consumption, and education; and 
family and friendship lives, although the form these may take in the four city scenarios 
are sketchy. 
We began by examining some early formulations of the nature of city lives, asking in 
what ways cities generate distinct patterns and why. We particularly noted the Simmel’s 
account of life in the metropolis and also that of later analysts. This included research 
carried out on the nature of urban villages, the significance of suburbanization and the 
ways in which cities are not just lived in but are also centres of tourism and consumption. 
Second, we described how cities in Britain developed over the past few decades, from 
the 1970s to the present day. We noted the shift from manufacturing towns and cities to 
various kinds of ‘de-industrial’ or ‘post-industrial’ cities. British cities experienced inner 
city decline as well as gentrification, of service growth and suburbanisation, of digitisation 
and surveillance. We noted some differences between London and the rest of Britain. 
Third, we documented the changing patterns of urban living around the world over this 
same period. We especially noted the global shift of city populations from North America 
and Europe to the developing world. In the latter there has been a striking growth of 
people living in informal settlements, but that these are not just places of loss but of new 
kinds of activity and practice. We noted some significant efforts to develop new forms of 
liveability within various cities outside the UK. 
Finally, we set out and visualised four different ‘cities’ that are possible by the middle of 
this century drawing upon much research and evidence relating to varied futures. These 
are the high tech city, digital city, low carbon city and fortress city. There are two crucial 
questions: are these coherent futures which could plausibly get to be sedimented; and if 
we backcast from 2050 which of these city futures are the most likely to be realised? 
What sets of events and processes would have to materialise in order that one or other 
such city future would develop and become dominant?  
Clearly many different shocks to the city system will occur over the next few decades. In 
Porritt’s (2013) somewhat analogous The World We Made these shocks include water 
riots in the Middle East, the peak oil moment, cyber-terrorist attacks on nuclear power 
stations, implementation of an International Financial Transactions Tax, hurricanes that 
produce total devastation across the US, the ‘Great Famine’, an EV with a 500 mile 
range, global food riots, spectacular climate change disasters and so on. He examines 
how these and other shocks interact over time and may come to result in varied 
outcomes although he considers that a benign solution will successfully emerge by 2050.  
The four city futures outlined above presents hugely different sets of lives for future 
residents of cities, from high tech ultra-mobile lives, to a digital convergence of machines 
and humans, to a powered down liveable city with a major reversal of existing systems, 
to a bleak dystopic world of city fortresses, wild zones and feral invasive species. A 
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further exercise would be to backcast from each type of city and examine what set of 
interdependent ‘shocks’ would have to occur in order that a particular city type would 
emerge.  
Obviously these different city types may come to be geographically concentrated in one 
or other region of the world although we would anticipate one being likely to be the most 
common. 
Finally, we do not think that the kinds of shocks to the systems would necessarily result 
in the benign outcome that Porritt (2013) elaborates. And whatever we may like to plan 
for is not going to emerge in any simple unfolding process. Indeed all ways of living in the 
future will involve many costs as well as benefits; none is simply best or ideal. None of 
the four futures is without many significant costs. So while maybe three-quarters of the 
world population will live in ‘cities’ in some sense in 2050 many of their lives will be 
‘nasty, brutish and short’. 
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